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ABSTRACT
Donations in Brazil:  
Should Income Tax Incentives Be Promoted? 
By
Paulo Rodolfo Ogliari
This study is aimed at considering whether the Brazilian individual income tax incentive 
related to donations should or should not be promoted. It was possible to see that tax 
incentives that promote donations bring some problems to governments, such as 
complexity, vulnerability to evasion, and reduction of revenues. But these incentives 
also make the tax system adjusted to the social interests, promote solidarity, increase 
the resource to public social funds, and reduce transaction costs. Summarizing, this 
research found out that tax incentives could change the donors’ behavior, stimulating 
new donations.  Until now, there is no budget problem to the Brazilian government, and
the donations could be increased. Based on the qualitative and quantitative data, the 
hypothesis that drove this work was accepted, which means that it is reasonable to 
create new tax incentives to encourage charity giving in Brazil. Therefore, the 
conclusion suggests that Brazilian income tax incentives related to donations can be
improved. It is also important to report that the charity giving in Brazil is lower in 
comparison with the US and other countries, such as Australia, and UK. Brazil and 
 
 
China have also some similarities in this field. Furthermore, the research makes clear
the role of the government as an `intermediator´ between social needs and social 
possibilities, however sometimes this intermediation is not necessary or desirable, 
according the agency theory.
Keywords: Individual Income tax incentives, tax credit, deductions, donations, charity 
giving.  
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INTRODUCTION
According to Brazilian Federal Law n.9.250/1995 (Income tax law), altered by the 
Law 12.213/2010, taxpayers are allowed to deduct from their income tax due the 
donations they make to public funds that take care of elderly people.1 This is a new tax 
incentive which has been available since 2011. But it is one among other deductions 
allowed by the law to Brazilian taxpayers.
Generally, the public policies have always good and bad aspects. In this case, 
the bad effects make the tax system2 more complex and difficult for millions of people to 
fill their annual declarations. Additionally, the incentives make the tax system more 
vulnerable to evasion, considering that the Tax Administration needs to check more 
things to evaluate the taxpayers’ regularity. There are also arguments against the 
reduction of tax revenue because it compels the government to search for new source 
of money.
On the other hand, the good effects originated by this policy are that these
incentives promote social solidarity, when one helps others consciously. The donations 
promoted by incentives stimulate people to change their behavior and spread it to other 
                                                          
1 Donations based on the Elderly Statute  (“Doações Estatuto do Idoso: A pessoa física pode optar pela dedução na 
Declaração de Ajuste Anual das doações, em espécie, aos fundos controlados pelos Conselhos Nacional, Distrital, 
estaduais e municipais do Idoso devidamente comprovadas, efetuadas o curso do ano-calendário de 2011, 
observado o limite global de 6% (seis por cento) do imposto devido para as de incentivo” – Found in
http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/PessoaFisica/IRPF/2012/declaracao/novidades.htm ). See information about 
legislation in http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12213.htm. 
2 Tax system is a set of laws that aim to collect taxes. 
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situations and moments in their lives. It is really different from the several kinds of 
incentives which only benefit the taxpayer.
Another aspect is that the value of deductions from donations in Brazil is not 
significant.  Although it could increase in the future, preliminary data shows that the 
donations are fewer at the present.  Consequently, one can say that such incentives will 
not change the volume of Brazilian tax revenue. 
Additionally, these incentives make the tax burden transparent, notably when 
society knows that the levels of taxation are increasing, but they do not realize how the 
money is used. This fact brings unpopularity to the government, and as the number of 
public services increases, it becomes more difficult to show where the public resources 
are used, bringing less transparency to the whole process. Consequently, the donation 
to public funds could demonstrate a direct connection between taxation and public 
activities.
Furthermore, if these incentives work as a “Taxpayer’s direct allocation,” they 
could reduce the government intermediation between social needs and public budget. 
The government could become more efficient because the collection of funds and their 
application in the public service is immediate, leading to a reduction of the expenditures 
to collect taxes and to allocate public resources. In sum, the taxation becomes better 
and cheaper.  
Above all these aspects, considering tax incentives that promote donations as a 
new and different topic that needs elaboration, this kind of public policy will be analyzed 
here. Although the society will never be completely satisfied because the problem 
related to unlimited human needs versus limited resources never ends, it is possible to 
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increase the satisfaction levels, especially if the quantity of public goods and products
could be increased. In the future, for example, new rules could allow taxpayers to 
recover green areas, maintain public parks, take care of children or old people, and so 
on, as a counterpart to reducing tax burden. Consequently, the society’s quality of life 
would improve without the need of further taxing.
This study intends to evaluate whether these Individual Income tax incentives
related to donations should or not be promoted by the Brazilian tax system. To answer 
this research question, the hypothesis developed in thesis is that these incentives 
should be promoted.
The methodology used is based in quantitative and qualitative data.
Unfortunately, there is not sufficient historical series to make a robust quantitative 
research, but of course there are numbers enough to bring insights and evidences 
about this field of study. The qualitative data also reinforces the knowledge about tax 
incentives and donations. The qualitative data will be useful to understand the
connections between different tax administrations, especially because it is better to 
analyze all the effects of taxation, and also to search the similar information in other tax 
administrations. Consequently, this study uses both qualitative and quantitative data to 
reach its conclusion.
To develop this study, this research will check the taxation system where the 
Brazilian tax incentives are inserted and to make a benchmark with other tax 
administrations3 . Although the tax system and this kind of institutions are peculiar, it is 
possible to make some analysis.  The Federal Revenue of Brazil (RFB) has a 
                                                          
3 The expression “tax administration” is a generic way to denominate public organizations that collect tax, and 
sometimes could substitute the official name as a synonymous. For example, Federal Revenue of Brazil – RFB could 
be called Brazilian Tax Administration. 
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homepage with information, and there are other sources in other media, including 
legislation. Thus, this work compares RFB incentives to, among others, the US Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), which has also abundant digital data available in the Internet.  
So, the outcome is expected to demonstrate clearly the differences and similarities 
between both institutions, and, moreover, to allow impartial criticism, especially about 
the Brazilian system.
This study plans, if possible, to see if the tax incentives provide transparency,
effectiveness, and equitability to the Brazilian Tax System. These three characteristics 
are contemporaneously desirable because the social needs are increasingly dependent 
upon public products and services, and people want to see the governmental 
institutions become more and more useful to society.  
Finally, the agency theory will be analyzed to support the arguments developed 
in this study. This theory certainly can help to understand the relation between 
government, society, tax incentives and donations. Therefore, it is expected that the
agency theory might help to explain whether individual Income tax incentives which 
stimulate donations should or should not be promoted in Brazil.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
This study intends to evaluate whether Brazilian individual income tax incentives
to increase donations should or should not be promoted. This question is important, 
especially after the new law which allows taxpayers to deduct from their due income tax
the donations they make to public funds designated to the care of elderly people. Then,
first of all, it is necessary to define the meaning of incentive.4
Thomas Enters et al., in a Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO)’s report, summarizes several studies about this word and concludes, “to
be of interest and to have an impact, incentives need to affect the cost-benefit structure 
of economic activities [….]”5 Hence, this paper defines incentives6 as something that 
encourages one to take a particular action.
The FAO’s report illustrates how incentive could be classified according to this 
example: “tax concessions for plantation investors are a direct incentive, whereas 
general tax reductions for fuel are considered indirect incentives […].” 7 Incentives 
                                                          
4 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, in its page 786,  defines incentive as “something that encourages you to 
do [something]: tax incentives to encourage savings.”   
5 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)’s Report, produced by Thomas Enters et al. 
Section 2: Incentives: key concepts, typology and rationale. 2004, 13. (“While there is no dearth of definitions for 
incentives, a single agreed definition does not exist (Meijerink 1997). Defined in very broad terms, an incentive is 
anything that motivates or stimulates people to act (Giger 1996; cited in FAO 1999). Sargent (1994; cited in 
Tomforde 1995) defines incentives as signals that motivate action. Other definitions refer to the “incitement and 
inducement of action” (Enters 2001). Within the context of development projects, incentives have also been 
described as “bribes” and “sweeteners” (Smith 1998).” )  See more in  
http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/ad524e/ad524e05.htm . 
6 More specifically, an on-line Business Dictionary defines tax incentive as a “deduction, exclusion, or exemption 
from a tax liability, offered as an enticement to engage in a specified activity (such as investment in capital goods) 
for a certain period.” Found out in: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/tax-
incentive.html#ixzz2UNYWwp7v . 
7 FAO’s Report. Ibid.  
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commonly include subsidies, price supports, tax credits, exemptions, deductions, and 
others. This work will also utilize incentives in this way. 
To clarify the use of some terms, this work will also consider that “tax credits 
directly offset the tax payable by a taxpayer. In contrast, tax deductions generally only 
reduce the taxpayer’s taxable income to which their applicable tax rate applies.”8 So,
the donations that motivated this study, based on Brazilian Elderly Statute and others, 
work as a tax credit by which Brazilian taxpayers could reduce their payable tax. This 
study is expected to answer questions whether this kind of incentive which stimulates 
donations should or should not be promoted.
To reach this goal, it is proper to start with an evaluation of the Brazilian tax 
system. Previous studies, especially Wasilewski’s thesis, conclude “that the Brazilian 
tax system is unfair and inefficient, it hinders economic growth and promotes income 
inequality.”9 Considering there was no significant change or tax reform in the last ten 
years, this conclusion is probably still valid at the present moment.
Gualda e Oliveira brings another study which states that the Brazilian tax system 
is structured by the Federal Constitution, with tax competences and limitations clearly 
defined. She  argues that indirect taxation on consumption is in fact regressive,
encumbering poor people who cannot avoid taxation or pay the same amount of taxes 
as rich people do. Her evaluation considers this system as “totally unfair.”10
                                                          
8 Brett Freudenberg. “Tax: Contributing to a Sustainable Arts Industry (Report #2: An international comparative 
study of tax concessions for the arts)”. 2008, 14.  
9 Luis Fernando Wasilewski. “The economic development and taxation system: a comparative study of Brazil and 
Japan” (Master’s Thesis. Yokohama National University), II. 
10 Luciana Gualda e Oliveira. “Estudo Comparado de sistemas tributários” (Comparative Study of Tax Systems, 
translated by author). Revista do Mestrado em Direito da Universidade Católica de Brasília, , volume 1, number 2, 
122- 26. 
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This opinion reproduces the common thought about consumption tax in Brazil, 
which tends to be replaced by the increase in direct tax. Considering the fact that food 
and basic products have low level of consumption tax in Brazil, perhaps regressivity 
does not have such an impact on poor people’s budget.  Furthermore, consumption tax 
could be managed to be selective and reach different goals other than collection.
Therefore, Gualda e Oliveira’s evaluation seems to be radical and apparently 
exaggerated. 
Considering that taxation generally brings inefficiencies 11 to the market, it is 
constantly necessary to check whether the tax system needs to be adjusted, especially 
in Brazil, where tax rules change frequently. This situation may explain why the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) confirmed that the 
Brazilian “government plans to try once again to rationalise the tax system […].”12
Consequently, it is possible to conclude that the Brazilian tax system needs to be 
changed in the future.
The main point in this negative assessment is related to the consumption tax.
The taxation is collected by federal, state and municipal tax administrations over  
industrial, commercial and service products, respectively. Then, when tax 
administrations change this kind of taxation, it causes an impact on the companies 
because there are 26 states and around 6.000 municipalities in Brazil, each one with its
own rules. Additionally, there are thousands of bureaucratic obligations such as filling 
                                                          
11 Joseph E. Stiglitz shows the opposite case in his paper New perspectives on public finance: recent achievements 
and future challenges, where he claims that   “Agency theory had one further extremely important implication for 
tax policy: traditionally, it had been argued in theory that issues of distribution and efficiency can be separated, 
and that in practice, in the absence of lump sum taxes, there was a trade-off. Agency theory emphasized that there 
were some redistributions which both increased equity and efficiency.” (See more in “Journal of Public Economics 
86.” 2002, 341–360 ) 
12 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.  OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil. Paris: 2011, 17. 
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out declarations, sending information, and others. The solutions could be to unify this 
kind of tax, or at least standardize the legislation, and reduce accessory obligations. 
The OECD report shows some information about Brazil and its high levels of 
taxation.  For example, the revenues passed from 32.5% in 2000 to 38.4% in 2010,
when compared with Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Probably it is the reason why the 
Brazilian tax system is sometimes criticized. More information about the Brazilian 
finance and economic subjects is evidenced in Table 1,13 prepared by OECD:
                                                          
13 Ibid., 4. 
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Table 1. Brazil’s general Information (Table prepared by OECD from Brazilian sources)
The OECD’s data from the United States (US), in the same period, demonstrated 
that the relation between revenue and GDP is decreasing since 2000. For instance, the 
top rate in the last thirty years reached 29.5 %(2000); the ratio declined to 24.8% in 
10 
 
2010.14 It suggests that the US and Brazil have adopted different policies in the last ten 
years.
Another difference between these countries is related to payroll and employment 
tax. An international auditing company (Grand Thorton’s Report) presents some data 
about this ratio between “social security and employment taxes” among several 
countries, where on one side is “Brazil at 27.8%. At the other end is China at 1.8%, 
followed by Vietnam at 4% and then the U.S. at 7.7%. Korea (8%).” 15 Then, it is 
possible to infer again that the tax burden in Brazil is sometimes bigger than in the US
and several countries.
With regard to public policies, it is significant to know what the tax system could 
do or is designed to do. Particularly, “in the US, the tax structure of deductions and 
credits clearly shows that home ownership is a major societal goal.”16 Therefore, it is 
possible to realize that the tax system has a correlation with social goals.
In this way, previous studies evidence that “the United States’ tax system has a 
number of mechanisms to facilitate donations; these relate to income tax and capital 
gains tax (CGT), as well as […] estate taxes on assets held in a deceased estate.”17
Charities Aid Foundation (CFA), also confirms “the UK and US […] have the most 
generous tax regimes [related to donations] but there is as yet no international research 
                                                          
14 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Statextracts (It is an on-line database). 2013. 
See more in http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=21699 . 
15 Grant Thornton International Ltd. 2010. “International taxation for manufacturing: A comparative review”. 
Chicago, IL, 2013 on-line  report, 6-7. See more in: 
http://www.grantthornton.com/staticfiles/GTCom/CIP/Manufacturing/International%20taxation%20for%20manuf
acturing/International-taxation-white%20paper.pdf. 
16Patricia Thornton et al. What Works and Looking Ahead: A comparative Study of UK and US Policies and Practices 
Facilitating Return to Work for People with Disabilities . Prepared for  US/UK Pathways to Work in the 21st Century: 
Seminar and Workshop. Washington, DC, 2003, 10—11.  See more in: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1228&context=edicollect . 
17 Brett Freudenberg. Ibid. 2008, 10.  
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comparing the precise effects of different tax reliefs on levels of giving.” 18 This 
information reinforces the necessity of seeking deeper understanding of the relation 
between donations and the tax system.
Despite the high levels of donations in the US in the past, some changes in the 
American tax system are worrying philanthropic organizations. It happens because the 
Obama administration is trying to limit deductions, alleging that it “would reduce the 
deficit, make the income tax system more progressive, and distribute the cost of 
government more fairly among taxpayers of various income levels.”19 These changes 
are expected to be applied to high-income people. 
Although there is controversy about the assertion of this political choice, the 
recent 2008 economic crisis is at the same time the reason why this initiative was 
proposed by the US government, and the reason why it should not be applied now. To 
show the relation between tax system and donations, Patrick E. Tolan, Jr. produced a 
long and detailed explanation about these two things and concluded: “[b]ecause 
America’s largest donors are those in the highest marginal tax brackets, efforts to limit 
deductibility of charitable donations could have a chilling effect on charitable giving.”20 If 
the donations are going down, the social needs will not be satisfied by charity
organizations and, then, social problems will appear, such as child care.
                                                          
18 Charities Aid Foundation.  “International comparisons of charitable giving”. (CAF briefing paper, Kent, UK). 2006, 
10. See more in http://www.cafonline.org/pdf/International%20Comparisons%20of%20Charitable%20Giving.pdf. 
19 U.S. Department of the Treasury. General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013: Revenue 
Proposals. (Washington, DC). 2012, 67.  The same position was reinforced in the report for 2014. 
20 Patrick E. Tolan, Jr. “Compromising the Safety Net: How Limiting Tax deductions for High-Income Donors Could 
Undermine Charitable Organizations”. 2012, 1. See more in 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=patrick_tolan, accessed in June 3, 2013. 
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On the other side, Brazil’s most important public policy is poverty alleviation. 
Although it is a good initiative and it is necessary to help poor people, this is only 
indirectly associated with the tax system, i.e., the revenue aspect. Such redistribution 
policy means that the Brazilian tax system takes money from one person and gives to 
another. This trend will eventually increase in the next years, as recommended by
OECD, which notes that “[f]urther progress in poverty reduction could be made by 
directing more resources to the successful Bolsa Família cash transfer programme.”21
Although the Brazilian tax system supports the government distribution policies, 
as an example of “public charity,” the law does not give the same freedom to the people.
When someone asks the government if he or she could deduct the donations to 
philanthropic, educational, scientific research or cultural organizations, the answer will 
be no because such “donations are not tax deductible, for lack of legal provision.”22
Despite this limitation to make donations, the new tax incentive based on the Elderly 
Statute could anyway be seen as a change on the Brazilian tax system. It is important
because it reinforces incentives which promote donations or, in other words, direct 
social allocations. Furthermore, it makes the tax burden more transparent, because one 
knows where his money is going.
It is noteworthy that one relevant source of information to develop this study is 
the book and articles produced by Charles T Clotfelter and his partners. It is important 
not only because he discusses the US tax system, but mainly because he produced a 
rich knowledge connecting federal income tax policy with charitable giving. His work 
                                                          
21 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.  OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil. Paris: 2011, 1. 
22 Federal Revenue of Brazil. 2013b. On-line Income tax Q & A: “These donations are not tax deductible, for lack of 
legal provision”,  translated by author.  (“São dedutíveis as doações efetuadas a entidades filantrópicas, de 
educação, de pesquisa científica ou de cultura? Estas doações não são dedutíveis, por falta de previsão legal”). See 
more in: http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/PessoaFisica/IRPF/2012/perguntao/assuntos/deducoes-outras.htm. 
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covers not only the effect on the taxpayer’s side, on the different income levels, and on
the different types of donors (individuals, corporations, bequests, volunteering), but also 
how the allocation of resources generally happened 23 . Therefore, this source of 
information brought relevant insights to this thesis.
                                                          
23 Clotfelter, 1985, and his articles. 
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METHODOLOGY
This thesis is a social study that uses quantitative and qualitative methods.24 In 
most cases, only the quantitative method is enough to find out the results and support 
conclusions. But in several cases, such as related to taxation, it is necessary to 
aggregate qualitative methods to produce consistent results, especially when the 
conclusion tends to affect future public activities. Consequently, this work will consider 
both methods to reach its conclusions and to base its recommendations.
Despite the lack of historical long-term data on tax incentives in Brazil, and the 
fact that the new incentive created in 2010 has not yet produced all its possible effects 
until now, there is enough data to support some evidences and insights. Therefore,
quantitative method will be applied to find out some information:
1. Effect of the new incentive, based on the Elderly Statute, in the Brazilian 
tax system. If this new public policy is good, this study should evidence
that:
1.1 The taxpayers applied the new incentive (donations to elderly 
funds), suggesting that the public policy changed the donors’ 
behavior;
1.2 Each year new taxpayers continuously apply the new incentive,
suggesting that this public policy stimulates new donations;
                                                          
24 See more in Bhattacherjee, Anol, "Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices". USF Tampa Bay 
Open Access Textbooks Collection.Book 3.  2012, 113-35. 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=oa_textbooks, accessed in June 07, 
2013. 
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1.3 The new incentive does not decrease other kind of donations, 
suggesting that this public policy does not compete with other 
policies;
1.4 This kind of incentive does not affect significantly the Brazilian 
individual income tax revenue, suggesting that this public policy 
does not bring budget problems to the government.
2. Comparison between the Brazilian and, among others, the US deductions
and donations, as a paradigm to know if the Brazilian incentives are lower 
than others, what would suggest that its levels could be increased.
Qualitative method also will be applied to find out arguments that support the 
claims related to the main goal of this study, which is defining whether Brazilian tax 
incentive related to donations should or should not be promoted. More than to using 
facts that lead to conclusions about the past, this method will hopefully be useful to
drive future public policies. So, the qualitative method will be used as a way to check 
the consistency of the result and, subsequently, to reinforce the conclusion as a public 
policy option.
This research will assume that taxpayers prefer to use tax incentives than to 
simply give money to the government. Although deductions in fact do not bring any 
financial advantage, because it is possible to choose between donations or tax payment,
but the money will not be refunded, a large number of taxpayers use the incentives.
This happens because it is better for them, considering that taxpayers have freedom to 
choose between giving money directly to charities or to the government, who will spend 
on social activities and, indirectly, distribute the money to charities.
16 
 
The option for these deductions could also be explained by the Agency Theory25,
whose assumptions affirm that the human beings are rational, self-interested and risk-
adverse. In this case, we can consider that the government is the agent and that the 
society is the principal. If it is possible to do something without the agent (government),
this option is better, because it reduces the transaction costs and minimizes the risks of 
not reaching the principal`s goals. 
The US will be an objective paradigm to realize whether Brazilian’s donations
and its incentives should be increased or not. Comparison to other countries will also be
done to give more consistency to this study.       
Summarizing, the quantitative and qualitative methods will be used to answer the 
research question and to verify the hypothesis that individual income tax incentives 
related to donations should be promoted by the Brazilian tax system.
                                                          
25 Stephen A. Ross. “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem”. In American Economic Review 
[63:2].   1973, 134-9.  
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DATA, ANALYSES AND SUPPORTS
This chapter intends to search data, make analysis and bring support to develop 
this study.
Tax System and tax incentive 
Governments and society prefer a simplified tax system, but it is not what 
happens in most countries. Certainly, flat taxes, low level of taxation, small evasion,
easy identification of the taxpayers and supportable tax burden are desirable. Most tax 
administrations, of course, do not appreciate tax incentives because they make the tax 
system more complex. In fact, the world is full of these characteristics, such as 
progressive tax, different rates, difficulty to understand all the tax effects, and large 
number of tax incentives.
Why do these things happen? One reason is the equity cared by the society that 
wants to build a fair tax system, where the taxation is higher for the wealthiest people.
Other reason is based on the different interests that exist in organized society, such as 
labor parties, consumer groups, producers associations, and so on. These diversified 
interests are reflected on the tax system, which becomes more and more complex.  
Brazil, for example, produced 29,694 federal laws and regulations related to 
taxation in the last 25 years, according to the Instituto Brasileiro de Planejamento e 
Tributação - IBPT26. When, to this number, one includes the legislation edited by states 
                                                          
26 Brazilian Institute of Planning and Taxation, translated by author. 
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and municipalities, the total reaches 309,147 different laws or regulations edited27, but 
most of them are not related to tax incentive. So, all these changes on tax legislation 
are supposed to make the tax system better, despite the fact that so many people do 
not agree with this point of view.
Economics explains better this fact, especially when the government wants to 
solve or minimize some market failures. “There are two classes of tools in the 
government’s arsenal for dealing with externalities: price-based measures (taxes and 
subsidies) and quantity-based measures (regulation)”, says Gruber. 28 In essence, 
taxation has different targets other than to collect money.
In this sense, donations receive tax incentives because the society wants to 
reach other goals, such as charity giving, solidarity and cooperation. Consequently, it is 
better for a society to have a tax system which is more complex in order to address 
these different aspects than to have a simpler one.
Reasons to make donations 
Moral values encourage people to make donations. It is also easy to find reasons
to do charity in several religions. Indeed, there are a lot of people who believe that
charity is a good thing to do, such as Peter Singer, an Australian philosopher, who
argues that “giving to charity is our duty.”29
                                                          
27 See more in https://www.ibpt.org.br/img/uploads/novelty/estudo/1266/NormasEditadas25AnosDaCFIBPT.pdf  
28 Gruber, Jonathan. “Public Finance and Public Police”. 2010, 146. 
29 See more in http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/charity/duty_1.shtml . 
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On the other hand, there are people who believe charity is “motivated largely by 
social approval, sociality, lifecycle celebrations, reciprocity, convenience and tax 
efficiency.” 30 Despite different opinions, there is no doubt that some people are 
influenced by moral or religious values to make donations.
Economic reasons to make donations 
But it is not only moral or religious values that support charity donations. 
Economics also gives support to charity giving. According to Jonathan Gruber, “one 
classic rationale for deviation from comprehensive income definition31 is the possibility 
that reducing taxes on certain activities will yield external benefits to society.”32
This deviation “are typically justified by the fact that the private market is likely to 
underprovide some good or activity: charitable giving and housing expenditures.” 33
About both possibilities, Gruber concludes that “the existing evidence  suggests that tax 
breaks for charitable giving may be justified on these ground, but that tax breaks for 
home ownership are not.”34
Gruber affirms there are two reasons why the government allowed tax incentives 
for donations instead of making expenditures directly to the charity. The first reason is 
related to equity and efficiency. This kind of incentive promotes horizontal equity as it 
                                                          
30 See the opinion of Dr Balihar Sanghera, in “Charitable Giving, Moral Judgements and the Problem of Social 
Embeddedness: An Investigation into Everyday Morality, Akrasia and Self-Deception in the UK”. University of Kent. 
2011, 16.  
31 “The Haig-Simons Comprehensive Income Definition is […] the individual’s total consumption during the year, 
plus any increases in his or her stock of wealth”, in  Gruber, Jonathan. “Public Finance and Public Police”. 2010, 536 
32 Gruber. Op cit. 2010, 539. 
33 Gruber. Op cit. 2010, 540. 
34 Gruber. Op cit. 2010, 554. 
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equalizes both people that are used to make donations and others that started to 
donate after the tax incentive was created. Additionally, the “tax subsidizes charitable 
giving, however, it may ‘crowd in,’, or increase, private contribution […] through both 
substitution effects (the ‘price’ of charitable giving has fallen) and income effects 
(because Ellie is paying fewer taxes […]).”35 Regarding this economic consideration, the 
efficiency of a tax incentive  “is the share of the tax break that goes to those who are 
changing their behavior [marginal impacts] versus the share going to those whose 
behavior is unaffected [inframarginal impacts].”36 He concludes that “subsidizing private 
giving is more efficient way of providing resources to the homeless than direct 
spending.”37
The second reason is related to the consumer or citizenship sovereignty. If the 
government spends directly, maybe “the preference of legislators may not be the same 
as those of citizen”. So, when the government is “offering tax subsidies to private
individuals to donate as they wish, the government directly respects the preference of 
its citizens.”38 Although there is no perfect answer about what is more efficient among 
those two options (direct or indirect spending), certainly donations are more transparent
to the taxpayers.
Agency theory and donations 
Apart moral and economic aspects, the sovereignty and freedom brings another 
relevant aspect to consider whether charitable donations should be improved. In this 
                                                          
35 Gruber. Op cit. 2010, 540-541. 
36 Gruber. Op cit. 2010, 541 
37 Gruber. Op cit. 2010, 542 
38 Gruber. Op cit. 2010, 542-3. 
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case, the agency theory is useful. According to Lupia, the “Modern scholarship has 
produced more precise insights about when delegation benefits those who delegate. 
Many scholars now adopt the language of principal-agent models (i.e., agency theory) 
to describe the logic of delegation”39. He considers that the “principal in principal-agent 
theories represents someone who delegates. The agent represents someone to whom 
authority is delegated.”40
Xavier Castañer, Assistant Professor at the University of Lausanne, explains
clearly how this theory is related to public subjects and notably to the government:
“How would agency theory apply to public administration?  In democratic systems, the 
(voting) population is sovereign and thus the principal (the people), which elects 
individuals to represent it as well as directly or indirectly lead each public administration. 
Thus, elected politicians who govern public administrations (prime ministers, presidents, 
and mayors) cannot be considered principals as shareholders are in private, for profit 
corporations but agents of the (voting) population.”41
Adding information about where this theory is found on the law, Pierce affirms 
that generally the “Constitution is premised on the belief that government should act as 
the agent of the people.”42 Then, the agency theory is applicable to governments and 
has traditional legal support in different countries. There is an example when citizens 
make choices in a participative budget.
Some public goods or services are better developed by government, of course, 
especially when it is impossible to control free riders or is difficult to collect money from
large number of people to do something. Some examples occur when it is necessary to 
                                                          
39 Arthur Lupia. "Delegation of Power: Agency Theory". 2001, 3. 
40 Arthur Lupia. Op. cit.  2001, 3. 
41 Xavier Castañer. 2011.  Applying agency theory to public administration (government). See more in 
http://people.hec.unil.ch/xcastaner/2011/06/08/applying-agency-theory-to-public-administration-government/  
searched in September 13, 2013. 
42 Pierce, Richard. “The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government”. 1989. 
22 
 
build bridges, dams, roads, etc. In these cases, the money collection and the production 
can be well performed by government.
Sometimes the scale makes difference. It happens when it is possible to reduce
marginal cost increasing the quantity of production or service. For example, some types 
of national vaccination could be inefficient if performed for small segregated institutions, 
because they demand large amount of efforts, money, and partner institutions, such as 
health employee, police, transportation companies, communication, and so on. Again, 
the government, or the agent, can perform better than the society.
On the other hand, sometimes governments do not know what the people needs 
are. When it happens, they should customize the service or products for each person or 
community, and the scale becomes less important. Then, the marginal cost increase, 
and governments lose efficiency.
Although it is possible for government to do several services, sometimes the 
citizens do not want the government to solve their problems. Nowadays, government 
produces extensive number of goods and services, besides a large number of 
regulations. Consequently, it becomes more bureaucratic, more onerous, less agile, and 
less efficient.   
For these reasons, the society also wants freedom.  It is desirable that people 
solve their problems as much as possible, because in several cases they make things in 
a cheap, quick, and better way. Government intermediates between social needs and 
social possibilities, but certainly people can make things freely and more efficiently by 
their selves. Furthermore, society can do several things without the government 
intermedition.
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When society solves their own problems they know what is happening. Large 
countries, like Brazil, need also large administrative structures that bring obscurity to the 
public action. It is especially true when someone intends to know “how” government is
working. So, it is always important to encourage people´s participation to solve some 
problems, because it brings transparency on the collective issues.  
Agency theory also helps to explain why tax incentives which promote donations 
could be preferred if compared to the indirect allocation by the government. It is better 
because it gives transparency to the principal (society), who knows where the money is 
going, and because it could reduce the transaction costs, and increasing efficiency, 
considering sometimes people can do things without the government intermediation.
Donations in China 
Considering that China and Brazil have some economical similarities, notably 
because they are important constituents of the BRICs43, this study intends to find out 
some information about charity giving in China, and to make parallels with Brazil. Some 
limitations have to be pointed out to bring a better understanding about the difficulties of 
this task. One is related to the language of some references, for it makes the research 
harder when the articles are written in Mandarin. Another is the difficulty to search the 
necessary information, generally fragmented in several places, and so on. In spite of all 
these difficulties, it is expected that the necessary information will be acquired with a 
certain level of truthfulness, which will help to develop the present thesis. 
                                                          
43 BRICs is an acronym for the developing countries who are driving the recent economic world trends, and it is 
compounded by Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Afterwards, South Africa also joined this group.  
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To understand what is happening in China, it is necessary to know the legal 
framework related to charity, and its connections with other fields. In 2009, Rebecca 
Lee produced some insights about it:
“However, despite the growth of charitable organizations and a rich tradition of 
philanthropy, China’s existing legal framework fails to support an effective charitable 
sector. This failure has three primary causes. First, there is no comprehensive law 
governing charitable organizations in China; the existing laws remain disparate and 
obsolete, notwithstanding a few recent attempts at reform. Second, the existing legal 
rules often fail to facilitate the operation of the charitable sector or incentivize charitable 
giving. Third, the charitable sector is plagued by inefficient bureaucratic modes of 
operation and governance.”44
Talking specifically about tax incentives, the income tax deduction for companies 
increased from 3 to 12 per cent in the last years, and that certainly encouraged more 
donations.  But, according to Long Zhaohui and Hu Xiaoling, there remained some 
pitfalls onto non-monetary donations: 
“According to current tax law, various taxes including enterprise income tax, deed tax, 
land appreciation tax, stamp duty tax and many other indirect taxes (value added tax, 
consumer tax and business tax) will be incurred upon donation. Donation expenditure, 
which is less than 12 per cent of accounting profits, can be deducted when calculating 
enterprise income tax, which will reduce donation cost and encourage donations [….] To 
summarise the preceding analysis, there are several pitfalls with respect to current tax 
policy of non-monetary charitable donations. 
1. Non-monetary charitable donations bear heavier tax burdens in that corporations need 
to pay indirect taxes and property taxes, while the amount deductible from income tax is 
lower. 
2. Categories of deductibles are ambiguous. 
3. While many different forms of non-monetary charitable donations are in place, relevant 
legislations and regulations are still lacking, which impacts negatively on corporate 
donation and governmental control.” 45
                                                          
44 Rebecca Lee, in Modernizing charity law in china.  Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association, Vol. 18,  Nº 2.  
2009, p.348.   
45 Long Zhaohui and Hu Xiaoling. Research on tax incentives for charitable donations of  non-monetary assets by 
chinese corporations.  Journal of Chinese Tax & Policy. Volume 3 Issue 1. 2013, p.27-8    
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These feedbacks explain some problems occurring in China. One of them is the 
current value donated, which reflects this situation and shows the charity giving has 
been going up and down over these last years in China. According to information
divulged by China Charity and Donation Information Center, in its annual report 2010-
2011, that is the situation about charity giving: 
“In 2010, total charitable giving was 103.2 billion RMB, (USD 15.8 billion) and accounted 
for 0.26% of GDP, while in 2011 it totaled 84.5 billion RMB (USD 13.25 billion) which 
accounted for a reduced 0.18%. Figures for both 2010 and 2011 include monetary 
donations (RMB 87.1 billion and 68.6 billion respectively) and in-kind donations (RMB 
16.1 billion and 15.9 billion respectively) -- that is, donations of goods such as clothing 
and food. […]Much like in 2008, (with the 2008 Sichuan/Wenchuan earthquake ) in 2010 
notable natural disasters (the Southern China drought , Gansu mudslide , and Yushu 
earthquake ) likely contributed to the 63.81% increase in total giving from 2009. 
Meanwhile the absence of any major disasters in 2011 probably contributed to the 18.12% 
decrease in giving from 2010.[…] In 2010-11, we continued to see a decrease in the 
percentage of overseas donations relative to domestic donations, from 12.5% in 2010 to 
10.9% in 2011. Both of these are lower than 2009's 14.1% figure. As in previous years, 
Hong Kong was the biggest source of overseas donations. Corporate donations continue 
to surpass individual giving, although 2011 saw a moderate increase in individual giving 
from 28% to 31.62%.[…] As noted above, 2011 witnessed fewer major natural disasters 
than 2010, and as expected giving to this area decreased in 2011 as a result. While in 
2010 the two areas which received the most donations were disaster relief and education, 
each receiving about a quarter of total donations. In 2011 education remained popular 
receiving 33.7% of donations while poverty alleviation was the second largest recipient 
area with 29.0% of donations[….]”46
In 2012, considering that there was no major natural disaster, the donations 
dropped again: “81.7 billion yuan ($13.35 billion) in donations from home and abroad 
were made in China last year, down 3.31 percent year on year, according to a charity 
report [….]” 47 This fluctuation shows that donations in China are dependent on
emotional aspects. Then, it suggests that charity giving is already not strong enough,
and reinforces the arguments for tax incentive to promote donations to charity.  
                                                          
46 See more in http://blog.socialventuregroup.com/svg/2012/09/review-on-charitable-giving-in-china-2010-
2011.html . 
47 See more in http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-09/21/content_16983041.htm. 
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In this way, Karla W. Simon, an American Professor of Law at Columbus School 
of Law, gave clear analysis about the trends of charity giving in China:  
“The Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA), which promulgated its 12th Five Year Plan for Charity 
in July [2013], hopes to enhance the role of charity and civil society in social development 
in China. The overall 12th “Five-Year National Economic and Social Development Plan” 
clearly articulated its commitment to the development of philanthropy, the enhancement 
of social awareness towards charity, and the improvement of tax incentives for charitable 
donations.”48
This plan is designed to work during 2011-2015 and represents the 
macroeconomic orientation for that country. Professor Karla W. Simon points out some 
aspects that ought to develop charity giving in China, as showed below:
“1. Write better legislation for the charitable sector. […]
2. Create a tax environment in which donations to charities are truly encouraged [...]
3. Develop a more effective volunteer policy.  […]
4. Promote a more developed charitable sector. […] 
5. Make the sector more open, transparent, and better governed.  […]
6. Create self-regulatory rules for the sector [….]”49
Items 1 and 2, above, are connected with legislation, notably tax incentives to 
promote donations. Both aspects recommend new and/or better laws as tools to 
develop changes on the current charity giving. Although altruism could feed charity
behavior, some incentives from government tend to increase donations, especially in a 
country where inequalities are growing faster than the GDP.
Items 3 and 4 are related to the essence of the charity giving. Both are focused 
on charity activity and the institutions that make it works. Here, more than taxation, 
                                                          
48 See more in http://www.fyse.org/2012/10/chinas-12th-five-year-plan-for-charity-2011-2015-a-brief-overview-
of-its-scope-and-intentions/.  
49 See more in http://www.fyse.org/2012/10/chinas-12th-five-year-plan-for-charity-2011-2015-a-brief-overview-
of-its-scope-and-intentions/. 
 
27 
 
these items are based on regulations and public policies which increment voluntary 
activities and donations. 
Items 5 and 6, above, according to Professor Karla W. Simon, are recommended 
to increase the transparency and the openness. Considering that China has a long 
tradition of using strong government control and bureaucracy, but lack disclosure, it is 
understandable that there could be some problems to develop and manage Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO). Although these aspects are more formal than 
substantial questions, they are significant to reinforce confidence in these organizations 
and stimulate donations. 
Particularly about openness, “[l]ess than a third of registered charities in China 
meet basic international standards for transparency and disclosure”50, according to the 
news published in World Time, based on the China Charity Transparency Report. This 
problem has negative effects not only for international donations, but especially affects 
the donations done by people in China.
In this regard, the Chinese Red Cross (RCSC) has serious credibility problems. 
Despite being one of the largest charity organizations in China,  this institution is in 
trouble since “[t]hings came to a head in 2011, when a young woman who claimed to be 
a business manager at the RCSC began posting pictures to her Weibo account that 
                                                          
50 See more in http://world.time.com/2013/09/25/chinese-deterred-from-donating-to-their-countrys-dubious-
charity-sector/. 
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documented her lavish lifestyle and luxury purchases.”51 So, trust certainly moves more 
charity giving than speech. 
Fortunately, the "2013 Annual China Charity transparent report" brings good 
news about transparency and disclosure.52 In this document, the Chinese government 
demonstrates that transparency is increasing among charity organizations, which is one
important step to promote donations.
This awareness makes it clear that Chinese government intends to promote 
donations. Despite these efforts, the amount of donations, “according to the government, 
has risen from $1.5 billion (10 billion rmb) in 2006 to over $7.5 billion (50 billion rmb) last 
year [2009…], is a negligible fraction of the $300 billion annually donated in the U.S.”53
Of course, both countries have different cultures and history, but there is no doubt that 
the U.S. is the paradigm to China. Another difference among these countries is that 
“[t]ypically, only around 20% of China's annual donations come from individuals; the rest 
are made by private enterprises. In the U.S., that number is closer to 70%”54
The individuals’ concern may be explained because “[t]oday, even for China's 
nouveau riche who are willing to give, government policies often fail to encourage 
charitable actions.” 55 The recent scandals, the lack of transparency, and other factors 
make the donations lower than U.S. in spite of the larger Chinese population. Hence, 
more efficient public policies could increase donations.
                                                          
51 See more in http://world.time.com/2013/04/30/post-quake-fund-raising-flop-exposures-credibility-failure-at-
chinas-red-cross/.  
52 See more in 
http://www.charity.gov.cn/fsm/sites/newmain/preview1.jsp?ColumnID=290&TID=20131008130627209393340. 
53 See more in http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2027055,00.html.  
54 See more in http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2027055,00.html. 
55 See more in http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2027055,00.html. 
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In an economically perfect world, there should be no taxes56. In an almost perfect 
world, there could be small and fixed per capita taxes. Perhaps, in a good enough world, 
a single and flat tax would suffice57.  But in the real world, especially in medium and 
large countries, there are several taxes, different brackets, complex tax incidence, and, 
obviously, a lot of tax incentives and exemptions58. It happens because the tax system 
has to accommodate an uncountable number of interests, such as fairness, equality, 
cultural aspects, social values, financial subjects, and so on.
On the other hand, the number of public services has not stopped to increase. 
From the recent past, when governments took care exclusively of national defense, to 
the present days, with hundreds of public activities and regulations, the public services  
are becoming larger and larger. Additionally, the society’s request for government help
never stops, such as after earthquakes in China, typhoon in the Philippines or 
international financial crises. So, the needs are infinite, and the money is not.    
Putting together these two points, public service and money to support it, 
probably tax collection will never stop, and eventually will keep increasing. But the 
charity giving sometimes could replace the government regarding public tasks, such as 
to take care of young, elderly and sick people, among other activities where public 
interest is present. Therefore, tax incentives can promote these kinds of behaviors.
                                                          
56 “The Perfect World!” A sermon by Pastor Vince Gerhardy. http://www.lectionary.org/Sermons/OT/OT23-
Isaiah/Isaiah_11.03-PerfectWorld-Gerhardy.htm, accessed in October 1st ,2014 
57 Although there are theoretical concepts that support these ideas, they mainly  came from the Author’s 
experience as tax law professor, accountant, and tax auditor at the Federal Revenue of Brazil.  
See also some insights in this article: “Is There an Ideal Tax System?”. http://www.visegradgroup.eu/visegrad-
parlour/ideal-tax-system, accessed in October 1st ,2014 
58 A Tax Reform Caveat: In the Real World, There Is No Perfect Tax System, by Ronald A. Pearlman , 
http://www.aei.org/files/2013/12/31/-toward-fundamental-tax-reform-chapter-7_131026229823.pdf , accessed 
in October 1st ,2014.  
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It is reasonable that some activities could be better performed by other social 
actors than the government. This case is exemplified by The Economist, when this 
media discussed “charity and taxation”, and noticed the trip of Bill Gates and Warren 
Buffet to China in 2012, as it is possible to see below:  
“Governments might spend money through charities not just, or even mainly, because 
they are better value for money, but because they work in ways that governments 
themselves cannot. In the most famous case, America's tax breaks allow it in effect to 
hire the world's most successful businessman, Bill Gates, as its agent for good works, 
buying the public the benefit of his acumen.”59
When someone intends to understand China, it is better to know what this 
country wants to be. According to Eileen Heisman, CEO of National Philanthropic Trust 
in the U.S., the Chinese donations will continue to grow. His concerns about that, 
published in 2013, are clear:
“This is my prediction: Chinese philanthropy will leapfrog over American philanthropy. 
They will seize social media and new technologies because U.S.-based techniques, like 
direct mail and checks, won’t be part of their “old guard” or existing infrastructure. 
Nonprofits in China don’t have to reinvent anything; they are starting to grow at a time 
when communication can happen almost instantaneously. […] Philanthropy has been a 
hallmark of American culture since its inception, one that Alexis de Tocqueville noted in 
the 1800s. It is an honor that China looks to the U.S. as a model for ‘good giving’.”60
Despite the lack of transparency, it is possible to conclude that Chinese charity 
giving is becoming mature as the government intends to promote the charity system,
and the average donations are increasing. In addition, it is clear that the U.S. is a model 
to China, who is adopting new tools and procedures to increase donations.  Therefore, 
more than a problem, surely charity giving could help to transcend some public and 
social security problems, which are starting to emerge in China. The US experience 
could also be a good lesson to Brazil.
                                                          
59 See more in http://www.economist.com/node/21556570. 
60 See more in http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/philanthropy/22864-philanthropic-leapfrog-giving-in-china.html. 
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Lessons from US         
 
Charity donations are desirable and supported by several factors as revealed by 
the moral, economic and theoretical arguments. Now, and after little benchmarking with 
China, it is necessary to know how donations are dealt with in other countries. In the US, 
for example, the tax administration (IRS) is used to giving tips to taxpayers about return 
application. The next table shows what kind of charitable contributions are deductible 
from Income Tax, and, at the same time, evidence the huge amount of organizations 
that can receive donations.
Table 2. US Charitable Contributions in 2012
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Source: IRS. Publication 526    Cat. No. 15050A
The IRS - Publication 78 clearly shows the number and the names of the
organizations allowed to receive donation in the US. In October of 2013, there were
817,318 organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions.61 This number 
evidences why US is known as a country that promotes charity and donations.
The US tradition on the charity could connect with the trajectory of their federal 
income tax. As it is possible to see on the next table, the individual income tax 
represents the biggest collection amount on this type of tax. Then, it is expected that 
individuals tend to do more charity than companies, and that could explain why there is
                                                          
61 See more in http://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/forwardToPub78Download.do. 
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a vast number of institutions that receive donations, such as churches, small 
organizations and others.
         Table 3. US Income tax History
                               
                       Source: http://www.usgovernmentrevenue.com/income_tax_history  
For example, in 2012, individuals donated 72% of all US donations, while 
companies donated only 6%. Foundations and bequests donated 15% and 7%, 
respectively. The donations went to religion (32%), education (13%), human service 
(13%), health (9%) and others institutions (33%), according to USA Giving report.62
These numbers confirm that donations are prevalent among individuals, and that
recipients are spread onto large quantity of organizations.
Another aspect to be considered is that donations in the US can be generally 
deducted 20% to 50% of the adjusted gross income. In special cases, this limit could be 
up to 100% of the adjusted gross income or be deducted in installments over the 
years.63 Indeed, the American legislation seems to be friendly to donors.
                                                          
62 See more in http://givinginstitute.org/giving-usa 
63 See more in http://www.irs.gov/publications/p526/ar02.html#en_US_2012_publink1000229802  
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Even more impressive is the volume of donations. According to USA Giving 
report, the US donations reached U$ 316.23 billion in 2012.64 This amount surpasses 
by far the donations to charity in other countries. This report shows that charity giving 
has decreased a little bit over the last ten years, but it has still been around 2% of GDP.
Despite the absolute value donated, it is important to know if it would be possible 
to compare US generosity with other countries.  The answer is given by Charity Aid 
Foundation, an United Kingdom organization, in his World Giving Index 2012, which 
confirms that US is classified in fifth place in giving behavior when compared to other 
countries. The methodology considers other factors (volunteering and helping a 
stranger), as it is possible to see on this table65:
                                                          
64 See more in http://givinginstitute.org/giving-usa 
65 Charity Aid Foundation. “World Giving Index 2012: A Global View of Giving Trends”. 2012, 13.  
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Table 4. Top 20 countries in the World Giving Index (giving behaviors in 2011)
             
Source: Charity Aid Foundation, in his World Giving Index 2012
In this ranking, the top place is occupied by Australia, followed by Ireland, 
Canada, New Zealand, and US. In other positions are: Korea (45th), Brazil (83th), Japan 
(85th), and China (141th). Particularly in Brazil, the scores of giving behavior are 24% 
(donating money), 12% (volunteering time), and 44% (helping a stranger). Then, the 
results evidence the Brazilian giving behavior has lower percentage than in US, 
especially on donating money and volunteering time.
Apropos, Clotfelter concluded that the “tax system has a much more pervasive 
effect on behavior than what can be observed in contributions alone.”66 It explains why 
                                                          
66 Clotfleter, 1985, p. 170. 
Country
Word Giving 
Index Ranking
Word Giving 
Index Score (%)
Donating 
money (%)
Volunteering 
time (%)
Helping a 
stranger (%)
Australia 1 60 76 37 67
Ireland 2 60 79 34 66
Canada 3 58 64 42 67
New Zealand 4 57 66 38 68
United States of America 5 57 57 42 71
Netherlands 6 53 73 34 51
Indonesia 7 52 71 41 43
United Kingdom 8 51 72 26 56
Paraguay 9 50 48 42 61
Denmark 10 49 70 23 54
Liberia 11 49 12 53 81
Iran 12 48 51 24 70
Turkmenistan 13 48 30 58 56
Qatar 14 47 53 17 71
Sri Lanka 15 47 42 43 55
Trinidad and Tobago 16 45 44 30 62
Finland 17 45 50 27 57
Philippines 17 45 32 44 58
Hong Kong 19 44 64 13 56
Oman 19 44 39 22 72
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donations and volunteering are much stronger in US than in other countries. He also 
connects both topics and emphasizes:
“Volunteering in Dye's equation is negatively associated with price of giving money, 
suggesting that volunteering and monetary contributions are gross complements. Taken 
together, his equations imply cross-price elasticity of -0.83. If correct, this finding would 
imply that policies lowering the price of contributions will encourage volunteering.”67
 
Brazilian donations
 
According to the IDIS - Instituto para o Desenvolvimento do Investimento Social,
the behavior of the Brazilians for the donation could be summarized in these topics: “a) 
Brazilians do not feel encouraged to giving and volunteering; b) Brazilians donate more 
to street beggars and churches than to civil society organizations; c) the most part of 
population (84%) does not know that is possible to make donations using part of the 
income tax; d) Children and elderly encourage people to donate money.”68
In comparison with US, these points show some differences, notably in 
volunteering.  Survey produced by IDIS in 2013, among Brazilians who did not donated
money in last 12 months, demonstrated the reasons why it happens:   a) I prefer 
volunteer work (1%); b) It is responsibility of government / crowd out effect (6%); c)  
distrust in non-governmental organization - NGO (12%); d) no one asked me (18%);  
                                                          
67 Clotfleter, 1985, p. 165. 
68 Translated by author. See more in http://www.idis.org.br/acontece/noticias/pesquisa-idis-ipsos-public-affairs-
retrato-da-doacao-no-brasil/    
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e) I have no money (58%). 69 Then, the long American tradition in giving and 
volunteering certainly is the more evident difference70.
On the other hand, donations for religions are relatively almost the same. Recent 
numbers show that American donations to religion are 32% against 30% in Brazil71.
This type of giving is prevalent in both countries eventually because the recipients have 
strong and efficient tools to persuade donors. 
Related to religious giving, Clotfelter point out that it is not completely charitable 
contribution. He considers that “religious groups pay for salaries, buildings, and 
operating expenses for local congregations, leaving a relatively small portion for transfer 
outside the congregation.”72 Perhaps that is why there is no incentive of personal 
income for this type of gift tax in Brazil, although these institutions are generally exempt 
from tax.
Comparing all the US donations that reached U$ 316.23 billion (2% of GDP) in 
201273 with Brazilian ones around US$ 4.7 billion (0.3% of GDP)74 evidences that 
Brazilian donations are lower than the Americans. The difference in absolute and 
relative numbers suggests that charitable contributions could be increased in Brazil. To 
develop this potential it is useful to use tax incentive among other ways to achieve this 
goal.
                                                          
69 Idem. See more in http://www.idis.org.br/acontece/noticias/pesquisa-idis-ipsos-public-affairs-retrato-da-
doacao-no-brasil/    
70 “In 1980 as many 80 million Americans did some volunteer work”, according Clotfelter, 1985, p. 3. 
71 See data from USA Giving report in this study, and link to IDIS in previous endnotes. 
72 Clotfelter, 1985, p.23. 
73 See more in http://givinginstitute.org/giving-usa 
74 This number was estimated and published in the Brazilian media by private organizations. See more in 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/empreendedorsocial/ult10130u864104.shtml 
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While trying to check whether Brazilian’s donations is really 0,3% of the GDP, 
some fiscal databases were used to confirm this standard. Using information provided 
by legal entities who have received donations and grants, has come up to the existing 
data in the following table. The numbers are higher, maybe because included other 
kinds of entities such as churches and trade unions, but still get a little under 1% of 
GDP and thus lower than American donations.
Table 5. Brazilian's donations and grants received by legal entities 
OBS: This table was produced by the author
In that direction, the next table shows the Brazilian individual income tax 
incentives’ evolution since 2006. Like other countries, the 2008’s crises reduced the 
donations in Brazil, but they have been recovering, especially after several laws and 
regulations edited since 2010 (Elderly funds, oncology care, disabled people) which 
stimulate donations. Donations to elderly funds reached more than two million dollars75
in 2011 (R$ 5,323,559.46). Considering that other tax incentives apparently were not 
affected by the new one, it suggests that this public policy is effective.
                                                          
75 Each US dollar is equivalent to R$ 2,2016 (selling dollar) in October 8th ,2013. See more in 
http://www4.bcb.gov.br/pec/taxas/batch/taxas.asp?id=txdolar  
R$Million
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
social assistance 3,485 3,936 4,024 4,788 4,720 5,250 6,265 6,906
educational 2,141 2,281 1,709 1,410 1,543 2,194 3,083 3,260
Trade union 185 216 290 304 308 358 362 409
civil association 2,261 2,789 2,905 2,748 2,932 3,569 3,716 7,764
cultural 340 439 460 478 565 600 689 666
philanthropic  (other) 2,842 3,202 3,024 3,372 3,302 3,420 3,820 3,606
Recreational 127 148 162 193 177 328 196 313
Science 607 687 134 171 105 138 229 230
other  (churches etc) 8,091 9,403 10,670 13,503 14,662 17,056 17,600 21,361
TOTAL 20,078 23,103 23,378 26,966 28,316 32,913 35,960 44,516
GDP 2,148,000 2,370,000 2,558,000 3,032,000 3,143,000 3,675,000 4,143,000 4,403,000
Ratio Donation / GDP 0.93% 0.97% 0.91% 0.89% 0.90% 0.90% 0.87% 1.01%
Observation: Most of these recepientes are tax exempted
Source: Brazilian tax administration, DIPJ Database
39 
 
Table 6. Type of donation in Brazil, per year               .
The absolute numbers of 2011 and 2012 demonstrate there is a gap in 
comparison with previous years. Beyond the 2007’s crises, which reduced donations 
temporally, It happened in both years because three new tax incentives were 
implemented (Elderly, Disabled people, and oncology donations). Together, they 
increased the donations in R$ 5,3 and R$ 13,1 million in 2011 and 2012, respectively. 
Additionally, a new incentive created by the Law 12.594/201276, have allowed 
making donations when taxpayers is filling their forms, and after the fiscal year was 
ended.77 This new procedure increased donations in R$ 18.3 million and R$ 21.1 million 
in 2011 and 2012, respectively. This new way to make donations is useful when 
taxpayer forgot itor when he wants to increase his donations, according his tax 
incentives limits. 
                                                          
76 Declarations of 2011 were filled in 2012 and the Law 12.594/2012 allowed taxpayers to make donations in that 
moment, using tax incentives limit of 2011, and so on. 
77 Fiscal year ends in December in Brazil, but the taxpayers filling their forms in the next year, generally between 
February until April. 
R$ 1.00
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Donations - Children 
and Adolescents  
Statute 93,532,853 80,664,873 68,152,643 71,491,065 77,324,767 98,158,118 91,258,079
Cultural incentive 15,250,362 16,718,857 18,005,257 17,578,185 19,424,818 21,569,343 25,130,947
Audiovisual activity 
Incentive 3,621,440 2,288,705 2,609,503 1,117,472 1,366,164 7,128,113 1,177,056
Sports incentive 1,907,698 1,481,818 1,340,116 3,075,619 4,405,642 4,883,881
Donations - Elderly 
Statute 5,323,559 4,875,746
Donations - Disabled 
people 3,442,714
Donations - Oncology 
care 4,749,469
TOTAL 112,404,655 101,580,133 90,249,222 91,526,838 101,191,368 136,584,776 135,517,891
Source: Brazilian Tax Administration
OBS: value is measured in Brazilian Currency, called  "Real" (R$).
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These three tax incentives, and the one created by the Law 12.594/2012,
effectively generated new donations. Together, they increased the donations by R$23.6 
million and R$ 34.2 million in 2011 (+23.4%) and 2012 (+33.7%), respectively, in 
comparison with 2010. So, this trend confirms that Brazilian tax policies are stimulating 
donations. 
Although the new incentives created in 2012, which allowed taxpayers to deduct 
donations to oncology care and to disabled people funds, 78 have separated tax 
incentive limits, apparently they might divert donations from other deductible or non-
deductible donations. This possibility should be analyzed in the future, with longer 
series data.  
Despite the increasing in the value, the number of donations did not recover the 
pattern of 2006 and 2007. Furthermore, all the tax incentives declared are really small 
when compared to the total number of declarations, as it is possible to perceive in 2011, 
when only 0,53% of all taxpayers made donations. It confirms the information of Charity 
Aid Foundation, cited above, that Brazilians prefer to help others directly other than to 
give money to charity. On the other years the trend is similar, as can be seen on the 
table below:
More than increasing the absolute value, there is increasing in quantity of 
donations, in the last years, who reached 144,019 in 2012. This number is lower than 
2006 and 2007 quantities because new procedures to enforce the compliance was 
created in 2003, such as the creation of Statement of Tax Benefits (DBF) 79. This 
declaration should be provided by the recipients Institutions with donors’ information. It
                                                          
78  See more in http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/PessoaFisica/IRPF/2013/declaracao/novidades.htm  
79 Declaração de Benefícios Fiscais (DBF), in Portuguese. See more in 
http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/Legislacao/LegisAssunto/DecBenFisDBF.htm 
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has allowed  double-check on the reported donations by individuals. As a result, many 
taxpayers’ donations may not have been accepted by the tax authorities. After several 
years, the quantities state were more consistent because the compliance of reported 
quantities was more easily checked. The ratio between number of donations and total 
individual declarations increased, especially in 2011 and 2012, and may reflect the tax 
incentive effects. Anyway, the volume donated in is small80. It confirms the information 
of Charity Aid Foundation, cited above, that Brazilians prefer to help others directly 
other than to give money to charity. On the other years the trend is similar, as can be 
seen on the table below:
Table 7. Quantity of donations in Brazil
When we delve into 10,43581 donations to the elderly funds in 2011, we find out
that 2.769 taxpayers made donations for the same fund in 2012. This group is 
supposedly comprised by the same people who used to donate to elderly institutions. 
But this number represent only 26,5% of all donations in 2011, against 7.666 (73,5%) 
people who are used to donate to several funds or donate sporadically. Both data
confirm that the marginal effect (taxpayers who have changed behavior and started to
make donations) of this policy is greater than the inframarginal effect (taxpayers who 
                                                          
80 These donations are only in money. There are some difficulties to donate in goods and properties using tax 
incentives. 
81 The data came from Brazilian Tax Administration and it was worked by the author. 
R$ 1.00
Item \ year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 Number of income tax declarations (individuals) 24,156,670 25,225,363 25,773,256 24,384,198 23,963,531 24,898,859 25,570,286
 Number of donations 151,369 157,798 112,193 105,159 111,123 132,414 144,019
 Ratio of number of donations (%) 0.63% 0.63% 0.44% 0.43% 0.46% 0.53% 0.56%
Source: Brazilian Tax Administration
OBS: value is measured in Brazilian Currency, called  "Real" (R$).
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used to make donations and have not changed their behavior). Therefore, this public 
policy may demonstrate effectiveness.
To understand a policy it is also important to know who is affected by this specific 
policy. In the case of donations for elderly funds, the policy affects thousands of people,
especially small donors. This is verified on the value of singular donations to the elderly 
funds in 2011. Out of 10,435 donations, 93.3% of them is lower than R$ 1,000.0082, and 
only 1% is higher than R$ 5,000.00. The more frequently donated value was R$ 120.00. 
Although the value is small, it is spread through large numbers of people and promotes
charity giving among Brazilians.
Figure 1. Brazilian donations to elderly funds in 2011
Source: Brazilian tax administration. OBS: This figure was produced by the author
There is another way to know whether the tax incentive works. It is possible to 
verify how the donations are spread among taxpayers. In the last five years, the total 
                                                          
82 Around U$ 450.00 
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number of all kinds of donations has been increasing in Brazil, except during the crisis
of 2008. This trend is spread among Brazilian states, as it is possible to see on the 
graph bellow. The most populous states generally have the bigger number of donations. 
In 2011, we have, in this order: São Paulo (SP), Minas Gerais (MG), Rio Grande do Sul 
(RS), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), and Paraná (PR).83
                           Figure 2. Donations in Brazil, 2011, per state.
OBS: This figure was produced by the author
Donations to elderly funds, particularly, tend to increase in the future, because 
some states and most part of the six thousand municipalities have not yet constituted 
their elderly funds. Although it is possible, at any moment, to donate to the national 
funds, when the funds are closer to the taxpayer, they will certainly be more interested 
                                                          
83 This information was inserted in this thesis because it is completely new and it is not found in any other source 
nowadays, for it has not been published.  This research regarding donations could be useful for future studies of 
the Brazilian tax administration, the public funds and academic researches.  
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in making donations. Then, when the majority of funds will be created, the number of 
donations will certainly increase.
The limits of tax incentives are important information that should be considered 
when these numbers are analyzed. The tax incentives created in Brazil until 2010, still 
used nowadays, need to share the same tax limit, meaning that they together cannot
amount to more than 6% of the Individual Income tax due each year. So, the same law 
that promotes donations in Brazil also refrain the volume donated, but this is also 
changing. Fortunately, since 2011, two new incentives have been created (disabled 
people and oncological care) and they have a separated tax limit of 1% each.
Nowadays the limitation is potentially 8% and comprises old tax incentives 
(Children, culture, and audiovisual donations), as well new ones, such as donation 
related with sports, available since 2007; donations to the Elderly funds, available since 
2011; and the two new ones available since 2012. This trend seems to be coherent with 
the government intention to develop donations in Brazil.
These two new tax incentives (disabled people and oncological care) have strong 
appeal in Brazil, maybe stronger than the elderly funds. In fact, 216 taxpayers who 
donated to elderly funds in 2011 changed their option in 2012 and donated to 
Pronas/PCD fund (disabled people fund), as well 314 taxpayers who changed to Pronon 
fund (oncological care fund). Both funds were created in 2012 and they have special tax 
limit each (1%), which apparently should not compete with other funds, but they 
eventually compete with each other, independently of tax limits.
Other relevant aspect related to the tax incentive is the additional multiplying 
effect of charity funding. When the incentive to donations is applied as tax credit (100% 
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refundable), the elasticity around 1. But when the tax incentive works as tax 
deductions84, the donation would reduce the adjusted gross income tax base, and the 
elasticity is less than 1, because each $1 donated reduced less than $1 in revenue.
When the taxpayer gives U$ 10 to the recipient organization, for example, the amount
saved in tax would be U$ 5, which means that the government would be spending U$ 5, 
decreasing the revenue in one part, but could save the double on the expenditures: 
Table 8. Demonstrative of Individual Income versus Charity allocation 
The advantages for the government could be bigger, if the tax burden were lower 
than the hypothetical 50% used on this table. Indeed, in Brazil the maximum level is 
27.5%, which means that for each $ 1 reduced from the revenue, it is possible to save,
at least, $ 3,63 85 on the public expenditures. It happens because charitable 
                                                          
84 Actually it is not the case of Brazilian rules, but it could be a new tool to promote donations in the future. 
85 See the calculation:   (R$ 100.00 x 27.5% = R$ 27.50), then   (R$ 27.50 / R$ 100.00 = 3.63 times).  
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contributions are bigger than the revenue loss. In this sense, the lower the tax burden in 
a country, the better will be the effect of a tax incentive to the public funding. Of course, 
in order to use this tool in Brazil, it would be first necessary to change the tax law.86
Considering that in most countries there are progressive income tax system, the 
deduction gives a crescent incentive to the wealthiest people to donate according they 
are reaching the top of marginal tax rates. It happens because the relative price of 
contribution decreases when they are climbing to the high tax bracket. Consequently 
one can think that kind of tax incentive is not equitable. 
Indeed, it happens. But progressive system of taxation is also inequitable 
because the tax burden is distributed irregularly among citizens, with large number of 
tax exempted people. Probably the best system ought to have reasonable distribution of 
tax burden. Bigger rates for high income people, but not too much.
Otherwise, excessive tax burden will not stimulate hard work or to try risk 
activities. For example, if someone work 1 hour more, but need to pay 50% of tax and 
30% in additional expenses, such as transportation, food, clothes, and so on, perhaps 
he does not want to save only 20% as net income to cover other potential problems, like 
to hurt himself, to miss his family, to become excessively tired, among other possible
complications. Thus, he will conclude that is irrational to work additional hour.
High marginal tax rates could also discourage risky investments.  If someone
were to try one, and his return is high, he will pay tax. But if he did a bad investment, he
cannot pass the loss to the government or society. Considering these both possibilities, 
                                                          
86 One option is reduce the Brazilian tax credit percentage from 100% to 25%, for example, or change from tax 
credit to deduction to adjusted gross income. 
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he could prefer to maintain his money in low risk activities, with low income, than to 
invest in risky businesses.
Together with these problems, there is the evasion. High marginal tax rates 
indirectly stimulate people to look for a way to reduce the tax burden, including illegal 
activities such as hidden income, transferring price, providing wrong information, and 
simulate or dissimulate transactions. Again, the tax progressiveness should be 
reasonable, and tax incentives could help to reach this goal.
On the finance literature there are discussions on having or not having tax 
incentives. The first option certainly has the intention to encourage some behaviors and 
also produce some public goods and services by NGO. The second one, without any 
incentive, makes the tax system simple and easy to use and manage for government 
and society. The both ways are possible, but in a contemporary and manage/ complex 
society, sometimes it is not easy to live with simple solutions.
In the US there are discussions about possible changes on the tax incentives 
from the deduction´s system to the tax credit system, which “would subsidize all 
taxpayers at the same rate”87, with supposed increasing in equitability. All proposes and 
estimations consider tax credit around of 20% on the donations’ value, and eventually 
non-refundable. In Brazil, there is a credit system with 100% and refundable.
Although the Brazilian system is more generous, it causes some problems. One 
is the revenue loss, because each $1 contributed reduces the same quantity of revenue. 
Second, there is a narrowness of the kind of giving, which causes diverting from the 
                                                          
87 Clotfelter. 1985, p 103. 
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non-deductible to the deductible giving. Unfortunately, there is no specific Brazilian 
database to know exactly how the effect on the non-deductible giving is.
In addition, the value donated in Brazil based on the tax incentives is small. As it 
is possible to see on next Table, the seven kinds of incentives, altogether, represented
only 0,13% of the total income tax declared by individuals in 2012. This percentage 
demonstrate the effect of the tax incentive to the elderly funds, available since 2011, as 
well as of the new ones created in 2012, and the children funds created after 201288.
Donations were also influenced by the crises in 2008 and the new standards of 
compliance after Statement of Tax Benefits (DBF) was established in 2003. Actually,
Donations are not significant when compared to the individual income tax revenue, 
which is one part of the total federal revenues.89
Table 9. Demonstrative of individual income tax versus donations declared    
There is an increasing in the absolute value and its relative proportion with total 
individual income tax due, which passed from 0,08% to around 0,14%, between 2008 
and 2011. Anyway, the volume donated in money is small90. It confirms the information 
                                                          
88 The donations to the children funds were modified after 2012 and it is possible to make donations when the 
taxpayer is filling the form.   
89 There are other federal revenues related to VAT on the production and importation, social security, other social 
contributions, custom tax, corporation tax income, and others. 
90 These donations are only in money. There are some difficulties to donate in goods and properties using tax 
incentives. 
R$ 1.00
Item \ year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total income tax due (individuals) 81,267,762,744 67,674,613,814 112,346,879,868 82,184,637,189 93,536,781,225 94,768,998,101 106,396,345,800
 Value of donations declared 112,404,655 101,580,133 90,249,222 91,526,838 101,191,368 136,584,776 135,517,891
Ratio of value donated (%) 0.14% 0.15% 0.08% 0.11% 0.11% 0.14% 0.13%
Source: Brazilian Tax Administration
OBS: value is measured in Brazilian Currency, called  "Real" (R$).
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of Charity Aid Foundation, cited above, that Brazilians prefer to help others directly than
to give money to charity. 
The loss in revenue is small because the contributions are also small. Although 
the absolute number of donations seems to be large, the relative number is not 
significant. After new tax incentives create in recent years, the value donated is also 
non relevant. Therefore, the tax incentives related to donations should increase more, in 
quantity and value, to become a relevant public policy.
Related to this concern, it is important to observe that $1 giving corresponds to 
$1 in revenue loss. But the problem is not only to lose revenue but who can do better 
with the money from society. Milton Friedman, awarded with Nobel Prize in Economics, 
has an expression to describe the government efficiency: “if you put the federal 
government in charge of the Sahara Desert, in 5 years there'd be a shortage of sand”.  
This famous economist used to criticize government actions, and also used to affirm 
that he was “in favor of cutting taxes under any circumstances and for any excuse, for 
any reason, whenever it's possible”91.
Government is not bad or good. It is a social organization which has limitations 
like other institutions. Then, maybe it is not good idea to ask government to solve all 
social needs.
Sometimes it is better to share the task with other partners. Nowadays, the Brazilian 
federal government has 39 ministries or secretariats with ministerial status and 984,330 
                                                          
91 See these and other ideas from Milton Friedman  in http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Milton_Friedman  and 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/m/milton_friedman.html. 
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employees (2011), including retirees. 92 This numbers not include states and 
municipalities data. Additionally, the country is large and with around two hundred
million people. These numbers could suggest how difficult is to manage and produce
public goods and services there, and why it is sometimes better when there is no
government intermediation. So, using tax incentive to promote donations could be a 
good idea to allow the government to concentrate in strategic issues. It is proper to 
remember that not all donations are accepted by the Brazilian tax administration. 
Considering that the tax incentive is limited to 8% of all income tax due, the 
spontaneous donations have been decreasing since 2006 and have become more 
dependent of tax incentive. The ratio of donations dependent on the tax incentive
increased continuously from 2006 to 2012, from 48.6% to 72.5%. This increase proves,
beyond the better compliance, the power of tax incentives to change the behavior of 
individuals. See more in this table:
Table 10. Tax incentive versus behavior of individuals   
When a country wants to create or improve its tax incentive, it is necessary to 
have confidence on the tax system. As the tax deductions could create opportunities to 
increase evasion, first of all, this kind of incentive could be a signal that the tax system 
is mature enough to deal with subjects related to evasion. Although there is no such a 
perfect system, the Brazilian federal tax administration has more than twenty-five 
                                                          
92 See more in http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/a-conta-do-inchaco-de-ministerios-no-governo-dilma-8432076. 
R$ 1.00
Item \ year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 Value of donations declared 112,404,655 101,580,133 90,249,222 91,526,838 101,191,368 136,584,776 135,517,891
Tax incentive limit  (6%+1%+1%=8%) 54,684,569 63,138,352 55,838,492 59,226,653 68,746,938 94,795,504 98,352,300
 Ratio of donations accepted (%) 48.65% 62.16% 61.87% 64.71% 67.94% 69.40% 72.58%
Source: Brazilian Tax Administration
OBS: value is measured in Brazilian Currency, called  "Real" (R$).
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thousand employees and a long tradition of processing income tax declarations.  For 
example, its experience allowed the country to use only digital declarations of income 
tax after 2010.     
In this way, the federal tax administration is used double check in documents 
filed by taxpayers. The procedures have used several databases received from 
companies, public departments, notaries, property registrations, renter agencies, banks, 
credit cards, nonprofit organizations who receive donations,93 and other institutions. If 
necessary, anytime it is possible to create new obligations for people or institutions, 
such as to fill forms or provide information.
Particularly about donations to children and adolescent funds, it is possible to 
contribute after the fiscal year, according to the Lei nº 12.594/2012. The compliance 
between donations and tax incentive will be check with the tax payments. In this case, 
There is almost hundred percent sure that there is no evasion. Despite the country 
being large, the recent development in communications and information technology, 
associated with new tax proceedings, has reduced the avoidance opportunities.  
Additionally, the Brazilian tax revenues are increasing constantly for long time.
There are complaints from taxpayers that tax burden is becoming hard, especially 
because it usually increases more than inflation. From less than 15% in 1946, the 
revenues reached 35.86% of GDP in 201294. So, the tax collections are higher in 
                                                          
93 For institutions who receive donations,  there is a especial declarations to be filed, called “DBF – Declaração de 
benefícios Fiscais” 
94 See more in http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/economia,carga-tributaria-cresce-pelo-3-ano-seguido-e-
chega-a-35-85-do-pib,173688,0.htm , http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/2439/1/td_0583.pdf , and 
http://portal2.tcu.gov.br/portal/page/portal/TCU/comunidades/contas/contas_governo/contas_10/fichas/Ficha%
203.1_cor.pdf  
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absolute and relative terms, and it suggests the compliance’s effectiveness promoted by
this institution, year after year. Then, it is possible to consider that the Brazilian federal 
tax system is presumed mature enough, and, in consequence, one can be confident 
that such incentives could be effectively worked under government control.
 
Final considerations
It is extremely important to know whether the tax incentives are really bringing 
new contributions. Considering that is difficult to find available data about donations in 
Brazil, empirical studies about this issue have limitations. To mitigate this problem, this 
study adopted two alternatives. One is using US as reference to apply Americam 
estimations and researches in Brazil. Other, looking for Brazilian databases that shows 
evidences of effects from personal income tax incentives.     
On the US estimations and researches, Charles Clotfelter in his paper “Charitable 
Giving and Tax Policy in the U.S.”95, produced some relevant insights about American 
donations. He suggests some changes in current tax incentives in the country, which 
include changes from tax deductions to tax credit, and possible creation of a floor. His 
brings some estimations as showed on the next table:
                                                          
95 This paper was “prepared for the Centre for Economic Policy Research Public Policy Conference on Altruism and 
Charitable Giving, May 11-12, 2012, at the Paris School of Economics in Paris (co-sponsored by le Centre Pour la 
Recherche Economique et Ses Applications).”  See more in 
http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/IMG/pdf/may2012-paris-clotfelter.pdf 
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Table 11. US predictions in tax incentive reforms.     
               
OBS: This is the Table 5, in Clotfelter’s paper “Charitable Giving and Tax Policy in the U.S”, whose source is 
Congressional Budget Office - CBO 96
Analyzing this table it is possible to see that there are several effects in each 
proposed change in tax incentive system. Each alternative affects different individuals 
and has various levels of complexity to implement. It is presumed that one which brings 
more contributions and fewer subsidies is better, such as the option “to extend 
                                                          
96 Clotfelder, op cit, page 25. See more in http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/IMG/pdf/may2012-paris-
clotfelter.pdf 
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deduction to nonitemizers, with a floor of 2% of the Adjusted Gross Income – AGI”,   but
it obviously is a political decision. 
One other insight is the relation between total contribution ($203,0 billion), based 
in 2006 levels, to the tax subsidy, whose number is $40,9 billion. It demonstrates that 
each $1 lost in revenue, taxpayers donated around $5. So, it is a good deal for 
government, except when related to large religious donations that obviously do not 
attend to public interest, but are most used to support worship and other activities. This 
trend and suggestions could be applied in Brazil, but it necessary to consider that the 
tax credit is 100% refundable in that country, which means that each $1 in tax subsidy
will create only $1 in donation.
Brazilian database, on the other side, has two possible evidences that show the 
effects of this public policy.  The first evidence shows that elderly donation increased in 
the first year, and partially decreased after a new tax incentive to protect disabled 
people was created.  Unfortunately, there is not a long historical series to check 
statistically the marginal and inframarginal aspects of this policy. But the second
evidence are more consistent. It happened after edition of law 12.594/2012, article 87, 
which allowed taxpayers to make donations after fiscal years were ended. In this case, 
donors only did donations because the new tax incentive gave this opportunity to 
taxpayer's when they were filling their forms.
The second case, related to 2011 fiscal year, there are not estimations , there 
are facts. The new tax incentives did promote new donations. In the first year that the 
new policy was implemented 25,828 taxpayers donated R$ 18,323,412.47, which 
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represent around eight million dollars. Then, the marginal effect was proved, because 
the taxpayers changed their behavior exclusively according the new tax incentive.    
Both cases are based in more than 25 million taxpayer's declarations who should
provide information to the government when their income is bigger than ten thousand
dollars per year. Most of them use standard deduction. People not obliged to declare 
supposedly have small income and, presumed, do only a small part of all Brazilian 
donations. 
Summarizing, the evidences presented in this study show that the donations in 
US are larger and most diversified than in Brazil. Analysis of the Brazilian data suggest 
that donations represent small participation on the federal revenues and effectively do
not affect the finance budget until now, but it tends to impact more because there are a 
100% tax credit on each contribution. On the other hand, charity giving could be good
tools to reduce inequalities and reinforce the social cohesion, and can be promoted by 
tax incentives because there are positive externalities.
In this direction, there are some tips related to the charity giving that could be 
useful to the development of public policies, according to the Charity Aid Foundation -
CAF97:
                                                          
97   The CAF is an UK organization that defines itself like this: “[w]e are a charity dedicated to getting the best for 
other charities and their donors. For over 80 years, we have found the most effective and efficient ways to connect 
donors to the causes that matter to them and for money to get where it’s needed. For charities, we provide not 
only financial services and advice but also donation processing, freeing them up to concentrate on the real work of 
making a difference. Making an impact in the charitable sector is what drives us. That's why we have spearheaded 
many of the changes that make the UK one of the best giving environments in the world.”  See more in 
https://www.cafonline.org/about-us.aspx.  Additionally, the UK tax administration recognizes the relevance of this 
Institution and used it as an example to teach to the companies and taxpayers: “[t]he Charities Aid Foundation is 
an organisation which, as well as managing other charities, is also a charity in its own right”. See more in 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ihtmanual/ihtm11132.htm.  
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“Governments around the world should:
 Ensure there is a named government representative responsible for supporting civil 
society, who is mandated to promote greater and more effective giving and social 
action.
 Maximise the effectiveness of civil society organisations by ensuring that minimum 
standards of governance and oversight are in place, through such measures as 
appointing independent regulators.
 Engender a widespread social norm for giving by celebrating the work of civil society 
organisations and individuals who generously commit their own time and money for 
charitable reasons, and encouraging others to follow their example.
 Collect and publish, in a transparent manner, robust data that allow the measurement, 
understanding and promotion of trends in charitable giving, volunteering and 
wellbeing.
 Champion the independent and diverse role of civil society organisations. 
 Ensure that donors can give easily and tax-effectively, without an undue level of 
administration - including giving across international borders.
 Work with civil society organisations and private companies to ensure that giving and 
volunteering are promoted in the workplace.
 Work with private companies to ensure that financial products and services, which 
promote and support charitable giving, are widely available. 
 Promote alternative sources of finance for civil society organisations, such as social 
investment, venture philanthropy and microfinance.
 Support civil society organisations to develop social impact measurement tools to 
enable them to communicate their effectiveness to donors and funders more 
efficiently.
 Facilitate and promote investment in new technologies that make giving easier.
 Support the sustainability of civil society organisations, by ensuring that policy 
facilitates long-term financial planning and promoting regular giving as a vital source 
of funding.”98
Considering these tips, and all the information in this study, it is possible to 
realize that the Brazilian tax incentives have room for improvement. It might happen not 
only because there are several manners to do this, such as to accept other types of 
donations, increase the number of organizations that can receive money, change the 
tax incentive limit or create new kinds of tax incentives. It ought to happen because it 
makes the people help themselves (giving or receiving donations), without the 
government intermediation.
                                                          
98 Charity Aid Foundation. “World Giving Index 2012: A Global View of Giving Trends”. 2012, 8. 
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CONCLUSION
In this study it was possible to see that individual income tax incentives which 
promote donations bring some problems to the government, such as complexity, 
vulnerability to evasion, and reduction of revenues. But the incentives also make the tax 
system adjusted to the social interests, stimulate volunteering, promote solidarity, 
increase donations, reduce the transaction costs, and give some transparency to the tax 
burden. Then, this study aimed to know whether the Brazilian individual income tax 
incentive related to donations should or not be promoted.
To support the arguments, there are some empirical studies, as well the primary 
and secondary sources used here, which have demonstrated that the value of 
donations is larger in the US than in Brazil. Indeed, the donations in US are around 2.0%
of GDP, and 0.3% to 1.0% in Brazil. The types of donations supported by tax incentives 
are also larger in the US. Using the US as paradigm was useful because both countries 
have similarities (size of country, large population, some taxation policies, etc.), and 
could be reasonably compared. The results suggest that Brazilian tax system has 
opportunities to create or improve incentives, now limited in 8% of the individual income 
tax due, to promote donations.
Particularly about the donations to the elderly funds, available since 2011, the 
numbers demonstrated that this policy was welcomed by taxpayers. On the first year, it 
reached the fourth position among five individual income tax incentives allowed by the 
Brazilian legislation to individuals. In 2012, it remained the fourth among seven tax 
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incentives. Then, the donations to elderly funds could be considered a successful policy,
and eventually could inspire other tax incentives.
The evidences found in this study suggest that the tax incentive for elderly funds 
changed the behavior of taxpayers because new donors applied continuously in 2011 
and 2012, despite the fact that some of them had never made donations or used tax 
incentives in the past.  Of course there is some competition among different types of 
donations, but it also happens because the tax limit should be shared with them. 
Anyway, this incentive does not change significantly other kinds of donations, 
considering that the volume donated to other funds increased at the same time.
Additionally, this kind of individual income tax incentive did not affect the 
Brazilian budget until now. The donation´s volume is really small, as all kinds of 
donations together amount to a relatively low rate, around 0.1% of the revenue from 
individual income tax. This percentage suggests that the public policy does not bring 
budget problem to the government.
Summarizing the evidences about donation to the elderly funds: 1) the taxpayers 
applied to the new tax incentive, suggesting that the public policy changed the donors’ 
behavior; 2) each year new taxpayers continuously apply to the new tax incentive,
suggesting that the public policy stimulates new donations; 3) the new tax incentive
does not significantly affect other kinds of donations, suggesting that this public policy 
does not make strong competition with other policies; and 4) this kind of incentive does 
not affect significantly the Brazilian individual income tax revenue, suggesting that this
public policy does not bring budget problems to the government in the current level.
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Additionally, the new proceedings created by the Brazilian Law 12.594/2012, 
article 87, which allowed making donations using tax incentives after the fiscal year 
ended, generated new donations.  It happened because the donations were made when 
the taxpayers are filling the tax forms. It proves the marginal effect of tax incentives and 
was verified in this study.
The agency theory was also checked and demonstrated that it would be applied 
onto the public subjects. More specifically, this theory could explain some benefits and 
problems related to taxation, as well as the role of the government / tax administration 
as an `intermediator´ between social resources and social needs. The agency theory is 
confirmed when the taxpayers increase the donations, even though such donations are 
not favorable, considering that they anticipate the expenditures by the individuals, and 
bring some troubles regarding tax incentives application. Even if it seems irrational to 
make donations, taxpayers do.
Considering that the government cannot provide everything required by society, 
charity giving makes people help themselves. It is desirable because it attends to the 
social needs and, at the same time, avoids the increase on government size and 
bureaucracy. Thus, tax incentives could be a good example of effectiveness of the 
public policies, and bring positive externalities.
Equity is also improved by tax incentives, at least for two reasons. First, it  brings 
horizontal equity among traditional and new donors because both can use tax 
incentives. Second, changing from the deduction system to the tax credit system or
adjusting the levels of tax credit, can also improve vertical equity because neutralizes
the surplus benefits obtained by people with high marginal tax rates. Additionally, the 
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standard deduction affect negatively the lower income taxpayers, but it is other and
better tax benefit than that provided by tax incentives which promote donation.
Therefore, tax incentives when well managed is supposedly good for equitability.
In conclusion, the evidences emerged on this study suggest that the Brazilian tax 
incentives related to donations could be improved. It is important to report that the 
charity giving in Brazil may be increased in comparison with the US and also with other 
countries, such as Australia, UK, and China. Therefore, based on the qualitative and 
quantitative data, the hypothesis that drove this work could be accepted, which means 
that the new tax incentives related to donations could be promoted in Brazil. Then, this 
public policy, when well-managed, can work with the assumption that this tax incentive
is good and, the higher its values, the better for the taxpayers and society.
Some recommendations can be made for the Brazilian public policy of individual 
tax incentives related to donations: 1) reduce the levels of tax credit to reduce revenue 
loss; 2) enlarge the possibilities to make donations, such as educations, health care,
etc.; 3) extend the tax limit to encourage new donations; 4) unify the tax incentive limits;
and 5) create tax incentive to promote  volunteering.
This work also suggests possible researches, notably about the tax incentives 
adopted in the US, their legislation and tools to promote donations, and how tax 
incentives could be spread into the society. Particularly in Brazil, several types of 
researches would include: ways to promote consolidation of rules and laws related to 
tax incentives; how to increase tax incentive levels; how to increase the number of 
donors that can make donations to relevant public fields, such as volunteering time, and
caring of public areas; how to reinforce tax incentives into federal, state and municipal 
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levels; and how they could create specific government departments to manage 
incentives. Finally, it is important to study how to stimulate direct allocations to develop 
and produce public goods and services without the intermediation of the government, 
because it could be a manner to call the society to solve public problems or demands 
where governments have difficulties to manage alone.
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